blog.ratterobert.com

falsifian (www.falsifian.org)

James Cook. Time-space trader and software hipster.

falsifian (www.falsifian.org)

@lyse Thanks for sharing. I really enjoyed it. The beginning part about the history of life on Earth was fun to watch having just read Dawkin's old book The Selfish Geene, and now I want to read more about archaea. The end of the talk about what might be going on on Mars made me a bit hopeful someone will find some good evidence.

In reply to: #l3hgwga 8 months ago
falsifian (www.falsifian.org)

@prologic

See https://dev.twtxt.net

Yes, that is exactly what I meant. I like that collection and "twtxt v2" feels like a departure.

Maybe there's an advantage to grouping it into one spec, but IMO that shouldn't be done at the same time as introducing new untested ideas.

See https://yarn.social (especially this section: https://yarn.social/#self-host) -- It really doesn't get much simpler than this 🤣

Again, I like this existing simplicity. (I would even argue you don't need the metadata.)

That page says "For the best experience your client should also support some of the Twtxt Extensions..." but it is clear you don't need to. I would like it to stay that way, and publishing a big long spec and calling it "twtxt v2" feels like a departure from that. (I think the content of the document is valuable; I'm just carping about how it's being presented.)

In reply to: #rqg5cxa 1 year ago
falsifian (www.falsifian.org)

@mckinley

HTTPS is supposed to do [verification] anyway.

TLS provides verification that nobody is tampering with or snooping on your connection to a server. It doesn't, for example, verify that a file downloaded from server A is from the same entity as the one from server B.

I was confused by this response for a while, but now I think I understand what you're getting at. You are pointing out that with signed feeds, I can verify the authenticity of a feed without accessing the original server, whereas with HTTPS I can't verify a feed unless I download it myself from the origin server. Is that right?

I.e. if the HTTPS origin server is online and I don't mind taking the time and bandwidth to contact it, then perhaps signed feeds offer no advantage, but if the origin server might not be online, or I want to download a big archive of lots of feeds at once without contacting each server individually, then I need signed feeds.

feed locations [being] URLs gives some flexibility

It does give flexibility, but perhaps we should have made them URIs instead for even more flexibility. Then, you could use a tag URI, urn:uuid:*, or a regular old URL if you wanted to. The spec seems to indicate that the url tag should be a working URL that clients can use to find a copy of the feed, optionally at multiple locations. I'm not very familiar with IP{F,N}S but if it ensures you own an identifier forever and that identifier points to a current copy of your feed, it could be a great way to fix it on an individual basis without breaking any specs :)

I'm also not very familiar with IPFS or IPNS.

I haven't been following the other twts about signatures carefully. I just hope whatever you smart people come up with will be backwards-compatible so it still works if I'm too lazy to change how I publish my feed :-)

In reply to: #pvju5cq 1 year ago
falsifian (www.falsifian.org)

@movq @prologic Another option would be: when you edit a twt, prefix the new one with (#[old hash]) and some indication that it's an edited version of the original tweet with that hash. E.g. if the hash used to be abcd123, the new version should start "(#abcd123) (redit)".

What I like about this is that clients that don't know this convention will still stick it in the same thread. And I feel it's in the spirit of the old pre-hash (subject) convention, though that's before my time.

I guess it may not work when the edited twt itself is a reply, and there are replies to it. Maybe that could be solved by letting twts have more than one (subject) prefix.

But the great thing about the current system is that nobody can spoof message IDs.

I don't think twtxt hashes are long enough to prevent spoofing.

In reply to: #bawn2ca 1 year ago
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